A Strategy-proof Resource Allocation Mechanism for RAN Sharing among Operators
Date Issued
2016
Date
2016
Author(s)
Chen, Ting-Hua
Abstract
Operators could alleviate their Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Opera- tional Expenditure (OPEX) by signing up RAN sharing contracts with other operators. Although the sharing scheme could be various according to the de- gree of the sharing, operators would cooperate and compete with each other at the same time. Therefore, the resource allocation results should always be guaranteed to be profitable for every operator. Besides that, the subscribers would also have their preference to the resources from different radio access network (RAN). However, the preference is kept by subscribers themselves. If all entities are assumed to be selfish, and tend to pursue the benefit for themselves, then once the subscribers are asked to reveal their preference, they sought to reply with the answer, which maximizes their utilities, and so do op- erators. Thus, a strategy-proof resource allocation mechanism is proposed in this thesis to tackle these issues. With this mechanism, the information could be truly gathered, and both operators and subscribers would be proactive to join this mechanism.
Subjects
mechanism design
game theory
RAN sharing
VCG auction
resource allocation
Type
thesis