A Research on the U.S.-PRC Military Engagement（1979-2015）:from Strategic Cooperation to Risk Management
Date Issued
2016
Date
2016
Author(s)
Liu, Chen-An
Abstract
This dissertation contains two major themes: analyzing the U.S.-PRC military engagement of its strategic objectives and constructing a dynamics theory from a structural realist perspective by accounting for structural factors, such as the international system, domestic constituency and interactions between U.S. and PRC. Previous studies tend to focus on the differences in U.S.’s military engagement policy toward PRC under different political leaders. I put forward two models of institution robustness for democratic and non-democratic states based on Putnam''s two-level game concept to explain the development of the U.S. and PRC military engagement and its behavior approach to strategic cooperation and risk management between 1979 and 2015. In order to balance against the expansion of Soviet, the U.S. gradually promoted military engagement with PRC since the late 1970s. PRC aligned with the U.S. against the Soviets for acquiring advanced U.S. military equipment and technology, the domestic modernization rather than intent on threatening Soviets interests via a military bloc with U.S. The U.S. and PRC continued bilateral military technology cooperation and arms sales so as to prevent the Soviet threat, and the U.S. suspended its military cooperation with PRC in 1989. As PRC’s power continues to grow, it has steadily broadened the substance of its PRC has also linked its “core interests” and “new model of military relations” treatises in an attempt to achieve a dominant country status commensurate with its rising power. Over the past decade, the relationship between the U.S. military and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forms the core of the U.S.-PRC strategic relationship. Both sides’ defense and military officials meet more regularly under the currently existing dialogue and consultation mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, the Defense Consultation Talks, the Defense Policy Consultation Talks, as well as through newly formed dialogue channels between each side’s strategic planning departments and armies. After the analysis of the two cases studies on the South China Sea disputes and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the study found that, in practice, PRC views US arms sales to Taiwan as a bilateral issue. It has effectively prevented major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and apparently achieved warning and diplomatic leverage effects in the defense of its “core interests.” Beijing has also adopted a more proactive external strategy since Xi Jinping came into power. These initiatives aim to consolidate PRC''s power position in the international structure and weaken the economic and trade influence of the United States. It provides us a better understanding of the dynamics of decision-making preference change, the role of leaders in government, and the politics of domestic, constituency-driven military engagement institutionalization under the governance of an international structure.
Subjects
U.S.-PRC relations
military engagement
structural realism
two-level game
risk management
Type
thesis
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