On Frankfurt-style Examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Resource
臺大哲學論評,28, 39-87
Journal
臺大哲學論評
Journal Issue
28
Pages
39-87
Date Issued
2004-10-16
Date
2004-10-16
Author(s)
Huang, Yih-Mei
DOI
246246/2006121215550888
Abstract
There is a important principle in the problem of free-will.
This principle is called “the principle of alternate possibilities”
( hereinafter : PAP)which states that a person is morally responsible
for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G.
Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP.
(“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of
Philosophy 66,1969,pp.829-39)
The “Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable
discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the
examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is
to discuss that whether Frankfurt –style examples undermine PAP?
(1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt–style examples? (2)
Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not
have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative
possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen’s three principles which is established the link between
ability to do otherwise and responsibility.
Subjects
Moral responsibility
alternative possibility
free will
metaphysics
determinism
Publisher
臺北市：臺灣大學哲學系
Type
journal article
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