Electoral Authoritarianism and Electoral Competitiveness: Do Elections Foster or Undermine Authoritarian Regimes?
Date Issued
2012
Date
2012
Author(s)
Lee, Kuan-ho
Abstract
After the Cold War, electoral authoritarian regimes have become the modal type of authoritarian regime. As a result, an increasing number of studies have begun to explore the effect of elections on authoritarian regimes. However, there is disagreement between scholars on the effects of elections in authoritarian regimes. One camp argues that such elections are an instrument of rulers used to stabilize authoritarian regimes; another camp argues that elections undermine authoritarian regimes and make democratization more likely. How do we explain these different points of view? Do authoritarian elections foster or weaken authoritarian regimes?
This thesis argues that the function of elections depends on the context and the key context is the level of electoral competitiveness. Under low level electoral competition, elections consolidate authoritarian regimes. In contrast, under high level electoral competition, elections provide an opportunity structure for the opposition to achieve democratization.
Facing a divergence in the literature, this study integrates the present arguments about how elections prolong authoritarian rule and proposes a “hegemonic equilibrium theory.” The thesis will elaborate how hegemonic authoritarian regimes realizes hegemonic equilibrium and reduce the level of political competitiveness by elections and why the low level of competitiveness in turn consolidates authoritarian rule and acts as a self-reinforcing system to stabilize authoritarian regimes. In addition, the thesis also explores the conditions under which authoritarian regimes gradually deviate from hegemonic equilibrium and embody a higher level of electoral competitiveness. This thesis will also explain why elections tend to provide structural opportunities for the opposition to achieve democratization under the context of a high level of electoral competitiveness.
The main unit of analysis is electoral authoritarian regimes from 1975-2007. I employ a time-series cross-sectional analysis to test the theory and divide the analysis into two parts. The first part discusses the dynamic differences between two subtypes of electoral authoritarianism: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. The two subtypes of authoritarianism both hold elections but their dynamic behaviors are distinct in terms of the level of electoral competitiveness. The thesis finds that competitive authoritarian regimes are not only unstable, they are more likely than hegemonic authoritarian regimes to democratize, but also more likely to undergo autocratic reversal
The second part tries to find the conditions under which the level of competitiveness in hegemonic authoritarian regimes will increase. The thesis finds that when economic performance of a regime deteriorates over a prolonged time, hegemonic authoritarian regimes are more likely to become more competitive, and higher economic development lowers the probability of increasing competitiveness. In addition, the thesis also finds that the effect of different types of election will interact with distinct contextual factors. Specifically, under the conditions of poor economic performance, the probability of legislative elections promoting the level of electoral competitiveness is increased. In contrast, under the context of declining state coercive power, only the probability of executive elections promoting the level of competitiveness is raised. The reason for the above finding is that legislative elections and executive elections have different mechanisms to consolidate authoritarian rule; therefore, when different contextual factors vary, only specific type of election is influenced.
Subjects
electoral authoritarianism
hegemonic authoritarianism
competitive authoritarianism
hybrid regime
electoral competitiveness
electoral type
large-N
SDGs
Type
thesis
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