The Optimal Pricing, Promotion and Product Strategies of a Manufacturer in the Presence of Coupon Resale
Date Issued
2009
Date
2009
Author(s)
Chang, I-Hung
Abstract
This paper analyzes a monopolist’s optimal coupon and product strategies in the presence of coupon resale markets. The results show that the effects of coupon resale depend crucially on whether the highs and the lows have differential access to the coupon resale market. When they have equal access, coupon resale hurts the manufacturer by reducing the optimal coupon face value, and the higher the social value of coupon resale, the more the manufacturer gets hurt. In this case, coupon resale encourages the manufacturer to develop a high-end item. When it is more difficult for the highs than for the lows to access the coupon resale market, coupon resale may facilitate screening for the manufacturer by reducing the effective redemption cost of lows, and may encourage the latter to offer a low-end item.
Subjects
coupon
resale,
product quality design
game theory
monopoly
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-98-R96741044-1.pdf
Size
23.32 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):5bc3b6ef9e618e720b9ffe3f39c32ef7