台灣上市公司股權結構與核心代理問題之研究
Date Issued
2001
Date
2001
Author(s)
柯承恩
DOI
892416H002065
Abstract
Is there adequate corporate governance
mechanism in Taiwan that is able to reduce
or control the damage resulting from
inadequate related party transactions?
Prior studies focus primarily on the impact
of corporate values by governance
mechanisms with insufficient research on
the moral hazard committed by the
controlling shareholders against small
shareholders. As related party transaction
constitutes a potential vehicle of moral
hazard by controlling shareholders, this
research aims to investigate the relationship
between corporate governance and related
party transaction. This research first
determines those related party transactions
that have negative effect on corporate
performance. It then finds out that when
the percentage of controlling shareholders’
cash flow to voting power gets higher, their
incentives for higher performance get
stronger. This implies the proportion of
related party transactions with negative
impact should be smaller. In addition,
when controlling shareholders do not serve
as supervisory directors, the percentage of
related party transactions with negative
effect is also lower as reflected in six
indicators. As a result, this research
suggests that listed companies in Taiwan
should prohibit supervisory directors from
serving as board director or employees in
order to maintain their independence and
exercise their monitoring function properly.
Subjects
Corporate Governance
supervisory
director
director
supervisor
related party
transaction
transaction
independent director
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學會計學系暨研究所
Type
other
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