A Pragmatic Conception of Truth and Semantic Paradoxes

The main objective of this research is to propose a pragmatic conception of truth and show
how the alleged semantic paradoxes could be dealt with on the basis of a satisfactory
pragmatic conception of truth. As I (Yang 2000) have argued, if we give up the semantic
conception of truth and hold a pragmatic conception of truth instead, then the truth predicate
is applicable to sentences without deflating its meaningfulness. As a matter of fact, a survey
of the semantic paradoxes and two main approaches, i.e. the hierarchy argument and the
truth-value gap argument illustrates that the failure of both approaches has its root in common
in that both take a semantic conception of truth. For on the traditional semantic conception
of truth, the truth predicate is applicable to any sentence without any restriction. And it is
the reiteration of the truth predicate in some cases, especially self-reference, which gives rise
to the well-known Liar Paradoxes. However, I shall argue that on the proposed pragmatic
conception of truth, the reiteration of the truth predicate applied to self-reference sentences
can be reinterpreted. The notorious semantic paradoxes can be thus dealt with. But exactly
what kind of a pragmatic conception of truth is appropriate? I shall propose that a
modification of Davidson’s program for a theory of meaning based on the conception of
radical interpretation would do the job.
I start with a brief description of Davidson’s program for a theory of meaning (as it is to be
characterized in a series of papers in (Davidson 1984)), and that of his picture of the concept
of truth (as it stands in a series of recent papers, (Davidson 1991, 1996, 1997, 1999)). I next
sketch the problems with liar paradox and its possible diagnoses. (Parsons (1974), Burge
(1979), Chihara (1979), Kripke (1975), Martin (1984)) In particular, I focus on a
satisfactory account of the truth-predicate. I then further argue that Gupta’s (Gupta (1993),
(2001)) revision theory of truth provides a promising account by appealing to the so-called
revision rule. But Gupta has to admit a circular concept of truth, which may weaken the
force of his theory. It strikes me that if we adopt Davidson’s doctrine of radical
interpretation, in the sense that an interpreter may gain so-called interpreted truth conditions
when the interpreter knows what the speaker means by uttering a sentence, then it can be
shown that in a sort of sense, Davidson’s radical interpretation behaves just like Gupta’s
revision rule, and the notion of interpreted truth conditions may pave a way to a satisfactory
account of the truth-predicate involved in the liar paradox. Of course, the notion of
interpreted truth condition may threaten the objectivity of the concept of truth. And I shall
briefly remark that Davidson has good treatment with regard to the requirement of the
objective concept of truth.