The Equilibrium Contract Rent and Reward Money Considering Modularity in Reverse Supply Chains
Date Issued
2012
Date
2012
Author(s)
Lin, Kuan-Wen
Abstract
The issues of environmental protection had drawn much attention in recent years. Due to eco-awareness and legislative requirements, manufacturers have to take the responsibility of recycling their own brand-name products. Many manufacturers require third-party logistics service providers to take the responsibilities for recycling operations of waste electrical and electronic products. We discuss the decision of the manufacturer and the third-party logistics service provider in reverse supply chains under asymmetric information. The model consists of a manufacturer, as a leader, and a third-party logistics service provider, as a follower. Each supply chain member maximizes its own profit functions, where the unit profit of recycled products is affected by the degree of homogeneity. This research derives the optimal contract rent for the third-party logistics service providers and the optimal reward money for customers. Finally, we discuss the impact of the contract rent and the reward money on the equilibrium solution, and we also investigate the impact of the unit revenue of recycled products and the reward money on the expected profit of the third-party logistics service providers.
Subjects
reverse supply chain
third-party logistics
recycle
homogeneity
Type
thesis
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