The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on Disclosure Level, Voluntary Disclosure, and Dividend Policy
Date Issued
2009
Date
2009
Author(s)
Shen, Chang-Wei
Abstract
Many studies have investigated the factors that influence a firm’s policy on information disclosure and dividend structure. These studies mostly took an economic perspective and addressed the issue based on cost/benefit analysis. Seldom have these studies considered the influence of directorate interlock. Yet many studies have found that directorate interlock could influence firms’ policy. This study investigates the influence of directorate interlock on firms’ policy toward information disclosure and dividend structure. We posit that firms tend to adopt the same policy as that of their interlocking counterparts. By analyzing the data of 495 Taiwanese publicly traded firms, we find that directorate interlock does affect firms’ policy on information disclosure and dividend structure. If a firm’s interlocking counterparts have high disclosure level or more voluntary discourse, it also has better disclosure and more voluntary disclosure. Additionally, if a firm’s interlocking counterparts pay higher ratios of stock dividend, it tend to do the same.
Subjects
Disclosure Level
Voluntary Disclosure
Dividend
Interlocking Directorates
Social Network
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