Rorty’s Recontextualization and Gadamer’s Fusion of Horizons

This essay first shows that the concept of recontextualization in Rorty
and the fusion of horizons in Gadamer are ways of thinking through which
knowledge is obtained. Then, I argue that recontexuationalization, as a way
of thinking in Rorty, fails both in the achievement of knowledge about reality
and in the establishment of Rorty’s philosophical ideal: edifying philosophy.
The argument implies that the concept of recontextualization is not able to
create a new paradigm by breaking the imprisonment of our present paradigm.
Nevertheless, as Gadamer’s fusion of horizon avoids the theoretical difficulties
existing in Rorty’s concept of recontextualization, it leads us to obtain the
knowledge about reality by being able to create new knowledge. Therefore,
in comparison with Rorty’s recontextualization, Gadamer’s fusion of horizons
is a more satisfactory theory of thinking.