Blind Spots in It? Jinsai's Account of the "Zhongyong (Ch?y?)"
Journal
臺灣東亞文明研究學刊
Journal Volume
12
Journal Issue
1
Pages
1-24
Date Issued
2015
Author(s)
Abstract
Itô Jinsai (1627-1705), a Tokugawa Confucian classicist, seeks to restore the "ancient meanings" of the original key terms in his commentary on the Confucian classic Zhongyong, Chûyô hakki (Elucidation of the ZY), by examining their uses in the ancient text. He forcefully "brackets" the metaphysical terms Zhu Xi (1130-1200) had introduced in interpreting the text centuries earlier in Zhongyong zhangju (ZY, in chapter and verse), denying that Zhu's "static abstract" philosophy of li/ri ? (pattern, principle) has implications for "dynamic actual" existence or can guide human life practice. He seeks to show that, on the contrary, the original ZY is practical and has implications for the conduct of ethical human relations. Jinsai's stance has local color and reflects Japanese understandings of Zhu's terminology, which viewed Zhu's key concepts, such as li/ri (pattern, principle), as wooden and artificial. Jinsai questions the coherence and relevance of Zhu's system, and develops a "common-sensist account" of human values to suit the formation of an actual society. Despite this background, Jinsai's argument in Chûyô hakki is based strictly on his classicist analysis of the text, so we can examine his argument straightforwardly. The present study argues that Jinsai brackets too much of the Zhu Xi and Song Confucian metaphysical reading of the ZY, leaving him insufficient conceptual ballast to support Mencian notions he tries to inject into the ZY in his own reading. He boldly deconstructs Zhu's frame and only recognizes the hard reality and experience of everyday life, yet slipping Mencian notions in the backdoor. The futility of his approach is underscored by the fact that the ZY represents a tradition that antedates Mencius, one that Mencius tried to ramify if not replace. The paper concludes when Jinsai views the ZY through the looking glass of his own culture and era, he reads the terms in the text very differently than they were read in classical and Southern Song China. Moreover, he associates zhongyong more with the norms of proper common practice than with the original Chinese notion of "utmost propriety." While his account is a departure from Chinese Confucianism, Jinsai does recovers some of the humanistic spirit in the original text. By using his classicist method, Jinsai sets off on the right path, but his blind spots prevent us toward the desired authentic Confucian destination.
Type
journal article