Why Resemblance is Not a Relation? －Trope Ontology in a Conceptualist Guise
Resource
國立臺灣大學哲學論評, 44, 001-032
Journal
國立臺灣大學哲學論評
Journal Issue
44
Pages
001-032
Date Issued
2012-10
Date
2012-10
Author(s)
彭孟堯
Abstract
It is argued that Trope Particularism need not take trope-level resemblance
to be an ontological primitive. The main idea is the appeal to the Arity
Principle suggested by Butchvarov. But, this does not mean that “resemblance”
is unintelligible. I propose that “resemblance” can be metaphysically reduced
to a second order internal relation over two first order internal relations such
as “greater than” and “heavier than,” and that the phenomena of similarity
should call solely for an epistemological or psychological explanation.
Subjects
殊性、相似、齊一原則、位元原則、內存關係
trope, resemblance, the Uniformity Principle, the Arity Principle,
internal relation
internal relation
Type
journal article
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