The impact of executive pay-for-performance compensation, corporate governance and SOX on reserve errors in the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Hsieh, Tzu-Huan
Abstract
This paper utilizes the loss reserve error to investigate the impact of executive pay-for-performance compensation on the magnitude of loss reserve error in the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry with different ownership structure. This paper demonstrates that managers with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity are more likely to make earnings-increasing reserving decisions. In addition, this paper examines the effect of corporate governance and the SOX Act on firms’ earnings management. This paper finds insurers with higher board independence are more inclined to under-state reserve estimates. And after the enactment of SOX Act, insurers tend to undertake earnings-decreasing decisions.
Subjects
賠款準備金
盈餘管理
薪酬績效敏感度
公司治理機制
沙賓法案
產險業
相互公司
Type
thesis
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ntu-103-R00723041-1.pdf
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