Non-compensation-related consultant service and CEO compensation
Journal
Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics
Journal Issue
10
Pages
59-75
Date Issued
2014-04
Author(s)
Abstract
This study examines how consultants' non-compensation-related consulting service (NCS) affects the contractual usefulness of accounting and stock information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay-performance sensitivity. The hypothesis is based on anecdotal evidence suggesting that consultants' provision of NCS is likely to adversely affect the quality of CEO compensation plans. We investigate whether the consultants providing NCS are involved in potential conflicts of interest. The results show that CEO pay is higher in companies where consultants provide NCS and have a higher NCS fee ratio. The pay-performance sensitivity in CEO compensation decreases when consultants engage in NCS. The overall results are consistent with NCS representing a conflict of interest and compromising the quality of compensation committees. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.
Type
journal article