銀行擠兌、暫停存款提領與銀行業之市場監督機制
Other Title
Bank Runs, Convertibility Suspension, and Market
Discipline in the Banking Industry
Discipline in the Banking Industry
Date Issued
2003
Date
2003
Author(s)
DOI
912416H002031
Abstract
This project studies the nature of information-based bank runs and the related policy
issues. It is composed of two related paper. The first one shows that the depositors’
incentives to withdraw are affected by their expectations on both the amount and the
quality of the bank-related information that will be revealed in the future. More
specifically, a bank run will occur when depositors learn that more noisy information
will arrive, or when they realize that precise information about bank returns will not
be revealed. Such bank runs are inefficient. The paper also demonstrates how
convertibility suspension can improve the efficiency of bank runs. By forcing
depositors to delay their withdrawing decisions until more information is revealed,
and by producing more precise information about bank assets, convertibility
suspension makes bank runs a more efficient mechanism for monitoring banks. It is
shown that convertibility suspension is beneficial if the fraction of depositors who
have liquidity needs during the suspension period is small, or if the liquidity losses of
the depositors who cannot successfully withdraw are not serious.
The second paper investigates the relationship between information transparency
and the fragility of the banking industry. It is found that an improvement in
information transparency may either increase or decrease the chance of a contagious
run. It predicts that, when a government imposes stricter information disclosure rules
in the banking industry, contagious runs are more likely to occur to banks with poor
information quality. In addition, contagious runs are more likely to happen when the
banking industry is weak.
The second paper also demonstrates that the contagious run problem can be
solved if banks hold enough capital or if some of the deposits are insured. It is shown
that, once contagious runs are eliminated, an improvement in information
transparency always improves depositor welfare. This result implies that, when a
government requires banks to disclose more precise information, it should also adopt
mechanisms that can induce depositors to use information efficiently.
Subjects
bank run
contagion
bank capital regulation
convertibility suspension
deposit insurance
information transparency
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所
Type
report
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