Global versus Local Auction
Journal
經濟論文叢刊
Journal Volume
26
Journal Issue
2
Pages
193-208
Date Issued
1998
Date
1998-06
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper considers the effect on competitive bidding when an auction is localized. Two kinds of auctions are considered: the first-price and the all- pay auctions. To some extent, the bidders exhibit opposite behavior depending on which auction is used. The Central Limit Theorem of Mosteller(1946) is used to explain the difference. Our analysis can be applied to various settings including school entrance, election zoning, and promotion.
Subjects
拍賣
競標
Auctions
Bidding
Type
journal article
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