Persuasion and Judgment:Modern Democracy from the Perspective of Classical Rhetoric
Resource
政治科學論叢, 55, 001-032
Journal
政治科學論叢
Journal Issue
55
Pages
001-032
Date Issued
2013-03
Date
2013-03
Author(s)
Hu, C.W.
Abstract
This paper reflects on contemporary democracy from the perspective of classical rhetoric. I argue that persuasion and judgment, the two main elements of rhetoric, are better concepts for understanding and critiquing actual democratic processes than rational speech and justification in deliberative democratic theory. Rational speech and justification claims a higher degree of abstraction, making it impractical in the real world and producing a gap between theory and practice. On the other hand, rhetoric provides a more feasible normative approach to scrutinizing public speeches, and provided a more attractive model of proper persuasion. The process of “persuasion” is distinctive from that of “justification.” Persuasion assumes greater attention to the specific audience and use of easily understood language. I contend that it also implies a form of “equality in speech” that is concerned with the specificity of the audience. In contrast, deliberative democrats presumes a universal and abstract audience, ignoring differences between audiences. This assumption of sameness sacrifices the power of persuasion. Furthermore, classical rhetoric emphasizes the importance of judgment; in particular, “arguing on both sides” allows the audience to better understand the issues and make decisions that are more robust. In conclusion, the paper shows that ignorance of theory means that political demagogues disappear. Classical rhetoric provides a normative and practical guide to the realities of democracy, and should be made a part of civic education in a democratic regime.
Subjects
修辭；說服；民主；判斷；審議民主；Rhetoric；Democracy； Persuasion；Judgment
Type
journal article
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