The Impact of Agents’ Professional Background on Income-tax Administrative Litigation in selection model
Date Issued
2010
Date
2010
Author(s)
Ke, Chi-Wen
Abstract
In the past, some essays analyzed the impact of agents’ professional background in income-tax administrative litigation, but most of them did not concern about that self-selection bias and sample selection bias may influence the outcomes in this issue. This article uses Heckman two-stage model to identify and correct those biases. The empirical evidence shows that accountant-agents could significantly give their clients higher winning rates, but there is no evidence to support that lawyer-agents could do so. Furthermore, the litigation with lawyer-agents takes more time than one without lawyer-agents. On the contrary, it is not significant that accountant-agents would increase litigation time period. The results could be references for the future amendment of the Administrative Litigation Act.
Subjects
Certified Public Accountants Law
Administrative Litigation Act
income-tax administrative litigation
litigation efficiency
litigation effectiveness
self-selection bias
sample selection bias
Type
thesis
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ntu-99-R97722007-1.pdf
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