Who is Influencing the National Pension Insurance? A Comparison of Decision-Making Process in Taiwan and South Korea
Date Issued
2010
Date
2010
Author(s)
Yeh, Yu-Man
Abstract
Taiwan began to discuss the establishment of national pension insurance in the 1990s, which was finally enacted in 2008 with the proposal by the Ministry of the Interior. Similarly, South Korea began the planning of national pension insurance during the period of authoritarianism in the 1970s, which came into force in 1988. Both Taiwan and South Korea had spent a long time of discussion before the national pension insurance was finally put into practice. This article seeks to explore the pension reforms in both countries from the perspective of political institutionalism in order to observe the change of ideas and interest formation during the policy process of national pension. Furthermore, this study aims to find out “who” has been influencing the policy processes of the national pension insurance, thereby identifying the “veto points” unfolded in the three aspects: the constraints of the political system, leading beliefs of the actors, and social structures. The effort is to study how the changes of political systems and actor constellations have impacted on the development for national pension.
The main findings are that the interplay of the dual-leadership system, minority government, as well as democratic transformation, has led to unclear political accountability, dispersion of executive power, policy discontinuity, and political immobilism. As such, national pension has become the point of policy struggle for claiming credit and shifting blame, consequently undermining the system consistency. From the processes of democratic dilemma to its consolidation, national pension insurance has well demonstrated the irresolute feature of policymaking in Taiwan. As for the pension reform of South Korea, the policymaking process has quickly gone through the legislation under the presidential-centered dictatorial system; however, with insufficient veto points, it has rendered the legislation of the national pension insurance to become a measure of political control. Only after democratic transformation and the corresponding increase of veto points could the coverage of national pension insurance possibly expand.
During the pension reforms in Taiwan and South Korean, the influence of political system and democratic transformation are leading Taiwan’s pension policy toward minor institutional integration, and it has become the product of welfare gap of old-age security. As for South Korea, under the guidance of powerful economic and political authority, it has sought at first to provide privileged economic security for the military personnel, civil servants, and teachers; then gradually broadened later its coverage after the democratic breakthrough. With the increase of veto points in the process of democratic transformation they have helped to influence the decision-making processes, indirectly shaping the outcomes of the national pension insurance. Based on the insights of the political institutionalism, this study of the policymaking process of pension policy offers a template for further analysis of diverse paths of social policy development in East Asia.
Subjects
political institutionalism
new institutionalism
national pension insurance
old-age security
Taiwan
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