The Grasping and Development of Frege's Sense
Date Issued
2010
Date
2010
Author(s)
Lai, Ten-Herng
Abstract
In this article, I will focus on the cognitive aspect of Frege’s notion of sense. Frege’s sense is understood as the mode of presentation of an expression. Accordingly, I will show that sense of indexicals and expressions used in indirect discourse are the rules governing the uses of those expressions; and the sense of proper names is the criteria of identification, without mastering of which one could not claim to have master the use of the proper name.
I will also examine some of the main difficulties against the Fregean account, such as externalistic arguments showing that sense does not determine reference, and Kripkean arguments against the senses of proper names. I admit that the externalistic arguments are successful if the cognitive value is to be preserved, but hold that the determination thesis is not essential to Frege. With regard to the Kripkean arguments, I will show that the epistemic aspect of proper names should not be ignored; furthermore, by understanding that the sense is some criteria the reference is identified, combined with the fact that senses could change and merge, and are open to error, the Kripkean arguments could be dissolved.
The acceptance of the changing and merging of sense does not lead to the conclusion that sense is subjective. Since the learning of the mastering of expressions necessarily comes from other users, it is in principle conveyable and thus graspable. The possibility of communication is thereby preserved.
Subjects
Frege
sense and reference
Dummett
Putnam
Kripke
Burge
Type
thesis
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