Game Theory Analysis for the Negotiation Process between the Landowners and the Implementers in Urban Renewal
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Chang, Yen-Han
Abstract
Urban renewal is one of the actively promoting policies in Taiwan. Implementing urban renewal can retrofit old building in the city, rebuild urban functions, and solve the housing supply and demand imbalance problem, these advantages makes it urban sustainable development priority. However, urban renewal business is ineffective, and even broke out a lot of controversy in recent years; the main problem is that landowners and perpetrators cannot accomplish an agreeable balance of their own benefits, bringing in many of the transaction costs in the negotiation process. This study is mainly based on Rubinstein bargaining model to construct a game theory model and uses the concept of bargaining power to correct payoff in order to fit the reality situation. The model can find the best proposal of the perpetrators and landowners in the urban renewal negotiation and provide a way to observe certain society situations. Finally, setting the actual urban renewal problem of progress into the model of observation and analysis, the situations includes land holding behavior, strategic asking price behavior, rider behavior, information asymmetry, and distrust. The model can be used to describe the process of distributing the urban renewal interests between the landowners and perpetrators, so that they understand their rights in the negotiation and the reward they deserve.
Subjects
Urban renewal
Game theory
Rubinstein bargaining model
bargaining power
Negotiation
SDGs
Type
thesis
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