The Notion of Happiness in the Nicomchean Ethics

This thesis proposes to inquire the core concept of Happiness (εὐδαιμονία) in Aristotle’s ethics by examining his work of Necomachean Ethics as main text. There are two popular interpretations in contemporary studies on Aristotle’s idea of happiness: the inclusive view and the dominant view. The former claims Aristotle’s happiness, as the final good and the final end, should include all intrinsic goods to be complete. The latter argues that this happiness in fact solely refers to the one best and most divine activity, that is, contemplation. In this research, I would like to point out the fact that the inappropriate interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of happiness lie in scholars’ inconsistent understandings of his crucial concepts. In order to reconstruct Aristotle’s own idea of happiness, I shall look into several ethical terms such as End, Good, Pleasure, and Virtue etc. in Nicomachean Ethics. In addition, this approach should be conductive to contemporary ethical discussions as well as our own civil lives.