Cheap Talk Games: Direct and Simplified Replications
Date Issued
2015
Date
2015
Author(s)
Hsieh, Fu-Wen
Abstract
We replicate the experiment designed by Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010), in which an informative sender advises an uninformed receiver to take an action (to match the true state), but has incentives to exaggerate. We find similar behavior patterns with Taiwanese subjects. In particular, we also find “over-communication”—messages reveal more information about the true state than what equilibrium predicts, and classify subjects into various level-k types. In addition, we conduct a Simplified version of the same experiment with only three states (and two sets of “catch” trials to keep subjects attentive). We find the results are more close to prediction of equilibrium model in this simplified replication, and more senders are classified as L2.
Subjects
Sender-Receiver Game
Strategic Information Transmission
Lying
Lie Detection
Laboratory Experiment
Type
thesis
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ntu-104-R01323046-1.pdf
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