Welfare and Policy Analysis of Misperception on Food Quality
Date Issued
2007
Date
2007
Author(s)
Lai, Chao-Huang
DOI
zh-TW
Abstract
Focusing on information asymmetry, a model comprising consumers’ and provider’s decisions was built to analyze the behaviors of consumers and provider. The impacts on social welfare were also analyzed when misperception exists on food quality and the abilities in distinguishing the quality are different within consumers.
The numerical simulations reveal that, food provider will cheat in food quality to make profits, the social welfare will be decreased and consumers with better quality distinguishing ability will enjoy positive welfare gains when misperception exists. In such situation, the best policy to prevent provider from cheating consumers is to impose fines on unfaithful conducts instead of eliminating or off-shelf passively.
Subjects
錯誤認知
食品品質
Information Asymmetry
Misperception
Social Welfare Analysis
Food Quality
Type
thesis
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ntu-96-D89627001-1.pdf
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