產品市場價格競爭與多產品廠商資本結構關聯性之研究
Other Title
Financial Leverage and Price Dispersion for
Multi-product Retailing Firms
Multi-product Retailing Firms
Date Issued
2005
Date
2005
Author(s)
DOI
932416H002036
Abstract
This paper studies the relationships among a multi-product in-
cumbent rm's business style, its bundling and pricing strategy, and
the impacts of these decisions on the design of the nancial contract
and the targeting strategy of a new entrant. We show that, unlike in
Adams and Yellen (1976), a monopolist may optimally adopt a pure
bundling strategy when it is faced with demand uncertainty and costs
of disposal for unsold products. We show that in such a monopoly
market, depending on consumers' valuation distribution, pure com-
ponents and mixed bundling strategies may respectively be optimal
for a marketing-oriented rm, but a production-oriented rm tends to
prefer a pure bundling strategy. When the incumbent is faced with a
potential entrant that is nancially unconstrained and uninformed of
the state of demand, pure bundling may appear as the incumbent's
optimal strategy because it raises the chance that the entrant may
target at the wrong segment, and when the loss of mistargeting is
signicant, pure bundling may result in entry deterrence. Moreover,
when the potential entrant is nancially constrained, the incumbent's
pure bundling strategy can maximize the state verication cost in-
curred to the entrant and its nancier, and may help deter entry. We
also document a relationship between equilibrium product prices and
the entrant's face value of debt.
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所
Type
report
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