Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities
Resource
Games and Economic Behavior, 43(2), 196-213
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Pages
196-213
Date Issued
2003
Date
2003
Author(s)
Sjöström, Tomas
Abstract
In order to calculate the worth of a coalition of players, the coalition needs to predict the actions of outsiders. We propose that, for a given solution concept, such predictions should be made by applying the solution concept to the "reduced society" consisting of the non-members. We illustrate by computing the r-core for the case of Bertrand competition with differentiated commodities. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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Type
journal article
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