An Assessment of the Stability of U.S. Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait Focusing on the Chen Shui-bian Period
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Author(s)
Wenger, Josh
Abstract
This study assesses the stability of American deterrence of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, focusing in particular on the period of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency in Taiwan from 2000 to 2008. A simple analytical framework is developed to test the interaction in the Taiwan Strait of two models of the outbreak of war: the deterrence model and spiral model. Understanding which of these models is dominant in the Taiwan Strait can help to identify the main source of deterrence instability and the appropriate US deterrence policy. If the deterrence model is dominant, China’s revisionism toward Taiwan is primarily motivated by gains and power-maximizing. Deterrence is most likely to fail because the credibility of US deterrence is insufficient. In this case, US deterrence policy should emphasize increasing the credibility of Washington’s threat to punish PRC aggression against Taiwan. If the spiral model is dominant, Beijing’s threat to use force against Taiwan is primarily motivated by threats and losses. In this case, deterrence is most likely to fail because China believes the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of war. In this case, American deterrence policy must emphasize reassurances to China that its security commitment to Taiwan is not intended to help Taipei change the status quo. he framework is first applied to examine the three major Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-55, 1958, and 1995-96 and then to analyze deterrence dynamics during the Chen Shui-bian period. During the three Taiwan Strait crises as well as during the eight years of Chen Shui-bian’s administration, spiral model dynamics were stronger than deterrence model dynamics. Though they are sometimes considered examples of successful deterrence, the three Taiwan Strait crises would be better classified as “reassurance failures” or “dual deterrence failures.” During the Chen Shui-bian period, China’s military threat was also primarily motivated by threats and losses. However, during this period, a military crisis was avoided in part because US policy emphasized dual deterrence. This study concludes that in the near-term, spiral model dynamics will remain dominant. The greatest threat to deterrence stability in the near future is the perception in China that the US supports Taiwan independence, not that the US security commitment to Taiwan lacks credibility. If Washington continues to practice dual deterrence, a militarized crisis in the near-term is unlikely. In the long-term, deterrence model dynamics may strengthen as China’s military power grows.
Subjects
Taiwan Strait crisis
deterrence model
spiral model
credibility
decision frame
reassurance
dual deterrence
SDGs
Type
thesis
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