Austin's conventional account of truth and Quine's semantic ascent
Date Issued
2000-07-31
Date
2000-07-31
Author(s)
DOI
892411H002028
Abstract
In Word and Object, Quine proposes a linguistic device, what he calls semantic ascent, by virtue
of which we can name a linguistic expression, taken as a whole, rather than use it as part of
sentences. In doing so, we treat linguistic expressions of the kind as objects of a certain type,
i.e. linguistic entities, so that the quantifier can range over these objects. In particular, Quine
claims that applying semantic ascent to sentences, we could legitimately use the truth predicate
'is true'. Nonetheless, this usage of the truth predicate seems to be inconsistent with his
disquotational account of truth. For on the disquotational account, the truth predicate is
superfluous, or can be at most construed as an identity function. Quine ((1986):12) attempts
to dissolve this latent inconsistency by arguing that the truth predicate is needed 'to restore the
effect of objective reference when for the sake of some generalization we have resorted to
semantic ascent.' This argument, as it stands, is not so convincing. In this paper I shall propose
that Quine's resort to semantic ascent provides in essence a pragmatic treatment of the use of the
truth predicate in ordinary discourse. Moreover, this pragmatic treatment can be extended to
ordinary statements, e.g. 'Snow is white' is true. And this treatment suggests that truth should
be construed as a pragmatic concept, rather than a purely semantic one. To justify this thesis, I
draw a comparison between Quine's treatment of the truth predicate and Austin's conventional
account of truth, which resorts to descriptive conventions and demonstrative conventions. For
it strikes me that if the truth of a statement can be characterized by virtue of demonstrative
conventions, as Austin so argued, then truth is essentially a pragmatic concept. As a matter of
fact, when we ascribe truth to a certain statement by means of demonstrative conventions, the
required demonstrative conventions tell us nothing about the nature of truth, nor do they add any
extra ingredients to the original statement. In short, the set of demonstrative conventions which
would render the given statement to be true is not intended to serve as a semantic rule. Truth,thus characterized, should not be treated as a semantic concept. Instead, the set of
demonstrative conventions involved would serve as a general principle or principles, which
explain how to use the truth predicate when a speaker says that a statement is true.
Subjects
semactic ascent
truth/meaning
truth-prdicate
descr iptive/demonstrative conventions
pragmatic conception of truth
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學哲學系暨研究所
Type
report
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