REPUTATION OF THE BOARDS AND THE TIMELY DEPARTURE OF UNDERPERFORMING CEOs AT S&P 500 FIRMS
Date Issued
2007
Date
2007
Author(s)
TOBON, JORGE MARIO LEE
DOI
en-US
Abstract
The evidence provided by this research is consistent with the proposition that the tenure of poorly performing CEOs of S&P 500 is determined to some extent by the so-called pure reputation incentives faced by the boards of directors. Young outside directors are found to be more efficient monitors than those near retirement age, especially in the post-2000 period. Most of the directors holding multiple directorships appear to be less shareholder-driven than previous researches have shown. In addition, the market performance of the firm exerts a great pressure on the boards to remove underperforming management. These results hold after controlling for regulated firms, which represent approximately one third of the study sample.
Subjects
董事
總裁
離職
聲譽
BOARDS
CEO
DEPARTURE
DISMISSAL
TURNOVER
UNDERPERFORMING
REPUTATION
Type
thesis
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