Logical Consequence: Tarski and Etchemendy
Date Issued
2003-11-30
Date
2003-11-30
Author(s)
林景銘
DOI
912420H002033
Abstract
In 1936 Alfred Tarski took a model-theoretic account of logical consequence as the standard
account, it terminated the dispute between model-theoretic account and proof-theoretic account.
Another dispute did not happen until 1988 that John Etchemendy criticized Tarski’s doctrine.
The first part of this report is to begin with Tarski’s intuitive concept of logical consequence,
then we discuss a critic of proof-theoretic account which was claimed by Tarski. We also talk
about Tarski’s account and the standard model-theoretic account of logical consequence. The
second part discuss some Etchemendy’s critics about Tarski’s account. The first critic is told
about the divergence and the incompatibility between Tarski’s account and the standard
model-theoretic account. The second critic is told about modal fallacy. The third critic, which
from the distinction between logic term and non-logical term, is claimed that Tarski could not give an adequate extension of the concept of logical consequence. The third part of the report we
discuss the difference between the concept of material consequence and the concept of formal
consequence. In conclusion, we give a brief solution about this difference.
Subjects
logical consequence
Alfred Tarski
John Etchemendy
proof-theoretic account
model-theoretic account
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學哲學系暨研究所
Type
report
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