To Wait or To Pay: A Game Theoretic Mechanism for Low-Cost M2M and Mission-Critical M2M
Journal
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Journal Volume
15
Journal Issue
11
Pages
7314 - 7328
Date Issued
2016-11
Author(s)
Abstract
When it comes to machine-to-machine (M2M) communications in advanced cellular networks, the resource allocation scheme should be re-examined to satisfy both low-cost M2M and mission-critical M2M. Because most M2M applications are uplink-dominated, we propose a mixed waiting-time auction and price-based dedicated uplink resource allocation framework for the low-cost and mission-critical M2M. The prioritized framework guarantees resources for traditional human-to-human (H2H) communications while meeting the needs of low-cost and mission-critical M2M devices on the basis of either time bids or direct price. In addition, the scheme ensures the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the interregional and waiting-time-based truth-telling properties. This indirect mechanism holds with Bayesian-Nash incentive compatibility, interim efficiency, interim individual rationality, and weak budget balance. The results show that low-cost M2M devices with lower energy awareness are more willing to participate in the waiting-time auction, while mission-critical M2M with higher energy awareness turn to directly pay for guaranteed access. The delay in connected mode and the optimal price vary according to the M2M/H2H traffic loads and resource pool partitions. This paper contributes insights that with proper mechanism design, low-cost M2M and mission-critical M2M can be served together, while the operator is financially compensated.
Type
journal article