Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy
Date Issued
2004
Date
2004
Author(s)
Hung, Hsiang-Shih
DOI
en-US
Abstract
This paper tests two models of dividends in Taiwan during the period of 2000-2002. And the empirical results in Taiwan support the expropriation hypothesis which argues that dividends signal the severity of the conflict between controlling and small shareholder. That is firms with weak corporate governance are associated with fewer cash dividend paying. However, the expropriation phenomenon is not such obvious gauged by deviations from control rights to cash flow rights. But if we replace deviations from control rights to cash flow rights with deviations from the percentage of board seats controlling shareholders occupy to cash flow rights, the expropriation by not paying dividends to shareholders becomes significant. This variable is proven to be more representative of conflicting interests between minority and majority shareholders in our regressions and proves controlling shareholders will exert their power in the board of directors to affect corporate dividend policy.
Subjects
股利政策
公司治理
corporate governance
dividend policy
Type
thesis
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