The Political Elites and Distributive Justice - case study on the allocation of subsidies for the 6th Legislators
Date Issued
2010
Date
2010
Author(s)
Guo, Kun-Wen
Abstract
This research will focus on 6th Legislators among politics elites. Based on Power theory, by analyzing executor of power, target of execution, area of execution, source and instruments of execution, the procedure of execution, object of execution, and consequence of execution, this study discusses the relationship between the allocation of subsidies and the legislators as well as how legislators force administrative department to allocate resource as their desires.
By analyzing the sum and number of cases in 12,847 subsidies cases, this study find out that the ruling party legislators do not get much more subsidies than their colleagues; however, the legislators belong to Non-partisan Union hold the key power and therefore get more resources under the circumstance which neither party takes majority of seats. Furthermore, this study concludes that senior legislators, legislators who server leader of caucus, or hold committee chair, elected legislators (other than seats are allotted to at-large and overseas compatriot members), legislators elected from urban area, winner of competitive campaign got more resources than their peers. Reelected legislators get a bit more subsidies than first-elected peers, but the number of cases for subsidies the reelected legislators got is the same as first-elected peers do. To sum up, the allocation of subsidies based on the power of individual legislators.
This study further finds out that the legislators who maintain good interactive relationship with administrative departments or take the approach of supporting the policies of administrative departments get more subsidies. The legislators who create negotiable atmosphere by threatening to slash budge are second to their peers mentioned above. The legislators who claim their relationship with those in high office and not actively evolved in lobby or those who boycott the budget toughly get the least of resource. Basically, the allocation of subsidies depends on the characteristics of legislators and the power held by legislators. However, this result is inconsistent with distributive justice. Furthermore, it cannot reflect the supervising character of legislators under separation of power principle.
Based on the above research conclusion, this study suggests that the administrative departments shall disclose result of the allocation of subsidies and add footnote to the item which is allocated based on the suggestion of legislators. By making the procedure of allocation more transparent, the public can supervise the allocation. Therefore, the allocation of national resources can be made based on public interest and distributive justice. The abuse of power can be avoided during the procedure of allocation.
Subjects
political elites
distributive justice
legislators
administration and legislature
allocation of subsidies
Type
thesis
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