最適策略性貿易政策的再研究：進口關稅與出口補貼政策的相互影響
Other Title
Reexamination on Optimal Strategic Trade Policies: Policy
Interactions of Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies
Interactions of Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies
Date Issued
2004
Date
2004
Author(s)
DOI
922415H002019
Abstract
This project examines the non-cooperative interactions between two exporting
countries and one importing country when all of them are seeking the optimal policies
to improve their welfare. While the importing country has the incentive to impose
tariffs on the goods coming from the two exporting countries, the export policies
chosen by the exporting countries depend on the tariff regime, whether uniform or
discriminatory tariffs are used. With complete information, it is argued that export
taxes are chosen by both exporting countries in some cases, and that while the
importing country prefers a uniform tariff regime, the exporting countries find a
discriminatory tariff regime preferable.
We also extend the Brander-Spencer (1985) framework to examine the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of export subsidy policy under incomplete
information when the firms’ costs are unknown to the exporting and importing
countries. With the assumptions of linear demand and two types of a firm’s cost, the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is that both exporting countries use a single
pooling export subsidy (tax) under a uniform (discriminatory) tariff regime. Moreover,
we find that the importing country would optimally choose a uniform tariff regime.
However, both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime as long as the
expected cost differential between the two firms is small enough.
Subjects
strategic trade policies
export subsidies/taxes
tariff regime
incomplete
Information
Information
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學會計學系暨研究所
Type
report
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