Physicalism and Qualia
Resource
國立臺灣大學哲學論評, 13, 161-184
Journal
國立臺灣大學哲學論評
Journal Issue
13
Pages
161-184
Date Issued
1990-01
Date
1990-01
Author(s)
Huang, Y.M.
Abstract
Any reductive analysis of the mental cannot captural the subjective character of experience. So the qualia is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of physical states. This paper includes three parts.
1. T. Nagel's what it is like argument' and F. Jackson's 'knowledge argument' argue that physicalism cannot give any explanation of the subjective qualities of our experiences and any physical informations cannot explain what red looks like.
2. An analysis and critique of the defenses of physicalism.
3. The argument against physicalism (identity theory) is an invalid argument.
Type
journal article