Standing in Administrative Litigation: A Comparison with the United States

Taiwanese administrative courts used to apply the causation test, which requires the existence of a causal link between the plaintiff’s allegedly injured interest and the defendant’s conduct, in examining whether the plaintiff has standing to sue. More courts, however, have started to apply the Theory of Protective Norms instead of the causation test in their adjudications. In order to clarify and to systemize the relationship between the Theory of Protective Norms and the causation test, this thesis attempts to propose a new standing rule through comparison with the United States law.
The proposed standing rule consists of two stages. First, the plaintiff must allege personal interest, injury of which is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct. Second, the alleged injury must be legal injury under the Theory of Protective Norms. This two-stage structure retains the causation test and prepose it to the Theory of Protective Norms, so as to filter out unnecessary litigations in a more efficient fashion. In addition, the new rule suggests that a plaintiff can satisfy the standing requirement only because this plaintiff has suffered injury in fact when statutes so authorize. Therefore, the Theory of Protective Norms in examining the standing cannot be applied in the following two types of cases. First, if a plaintiff initiates litigation in pursuant to a citizen suit provision, this plaintiff is entitled to sue as long as having allegedly suffered injury in fact as a “victim”. Second, if a plaintiff challenges an administrative disposition under the former part of Article 92, second paragraph of the Administrative Procedure Act, this plaintiff obtains standing only when having allegedly suffered injury in fact that bears the “general characteristics” formed by the specific facts in a given case. This thesis also attempts to propose a “purpose-effect beneficiary test” that helps manipulate the Theory of Protective Norms.