The Oscillation of Small States When Confronting A Stronger Neighbor with Sovereignty Demand - The Cases of Taiwan Strait and Ukraine-Russia Relations
Date Issued
2016
Date
2016
Author(s)
Lai, Yi-Ting
Abstract
The oscillation of states’ behaviors has long been treated in the academic field of IR as a descriptive term rather than a theoretical concept. Many researchers are aware of the phenomenon of states’ oscillation but still choose to believe that small states confronting a stronger neighbor would accurately recognize the pertinent conditions and decisively take a strategic posture between the so-called balancing and bandwagoning. However, conditions which a small state faces are not necessarily as clear as crystal. There are some gray areas where conditions are obscure, and small states are unable to identify a preferable choice. From the viewpoint of this thesis, only when the concept of oscillation and gray areas are integrated into the existing theories can we better understand and explain the responding behaviors of small states towards a strong neighboring country. According to the “Progression of Strategic Postures” theory, small states’ response towards the strong neighbor with sovereignty demand can all be classified into twelve progression scenarios. The level of external threat posed by the strong neighbor and the level of physical resources possessed by the small state would jointly decide the progression scenario which the small state is in. In short, the higher the external threat is, the more extreme the responding options will be; conversely, the lower the external threat is, the more moderate the responding options will be. In addition, the level of foreign supports will decide which the small state will do between continuously taking confrontation-based options, continuously taking concession-based options and wavering among the afore-mentioned two options. Lastly, the level of economic development will decide the small state’s fragility of international intervention. The Ukraine case, which starts in 1991, and the Taiwan case, which starts in 1979, belong to two different progression scenarios. Russia still held sovereignty ambition towards Ukraine after the Soviet Union had been dissolved, but Russia was bounded by its weaker national power and could only pose low-level threat to Ukraine. The West, on the other hand, had not given the green light to Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership before 2014. It caused the economically disadvantaged Ukraine unable to get away from the Passive Oscillation Period of Lower Threat. Taiwan has long been under low-level threat since the PRC adopted the strategy of Peaceful Unification and under medium-level support since the USA terminated Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. The economically prosperous Taiwan was thus forced to enter the Autonomous Progression Period of Low Threat. As the mainland China keeps growing economically at speed, Taiwan could lose the advantage of economical development and be forced to enter the Neutral Progression Period of Low Threat. At that point, the USA and the PRC will be more likely to intervene in Taiwan’s internal political process, Taiwan’s oscillation frequency will start to rise, and Taiwan’s political stability will drop.
Subjects
Small States
Oscillation of Strategic Postures
Power Asymmetry
Ukraine-Russia Relations
Cross-Strait Relations
Type
thesis
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