Evolove of Inequity Aversion, Using Evolutionary Method
Date Issued
2016
Date
2016
Author(s)
Tseng, Pei-En
Abstract
This article explores how evolution may shape inequity aversion, using ultimatumgame. Based on Fehr & Schmidt(1999)(1), in addition to payoff, utility is also affectedby the difference between own and other’s payoff. If the difference in payoffs may producedisutility, the degree of this disutility could depend on how inequity averse eachparticipant is. This sensitivity of inequity aversion may pass on to the offspring. Considering own and other’s payoff, the participant chooses a strategy which maximizes his utility. The payoff associated with his strategy then influences how many offspring he has. We first find out all equilibria before adding mutations. Then analyse how difficult to move from one equilibrium to another. By calculating resistance, the least number of mutations required to make the system escape from the basin of an equilibrium, we analyse the relative stability among different equilibria first, and the find out the most stable equilibrium.
Subjects
inequity aversion
evolutionary method
selection
mutation
ultimatum game
Type
thesis
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