A Study on The Legislative Yuan’s Oversight Over Operations in Government-operated Non-governmental Organizations
Date Issued
2009
Date
2009
Author(s)
Yang, Ching-Ju
Abstract
To promote its public polices, our Government has been consistently donated funds to all kinds of NPOs for quite a while. Operated after all these years, a lot of malpractices originated from the system. This outcome can be attributed to two main factors, lack of uniform regulations regarding NPOs’ supervision and administration is one, and executive departments play comparatively weak roles as supervisors is the other. According to the IMF’s definition on so called “government”, any governmental agencies or non-profit organizations, which provide non-profit oriented services as well as either controlled or sponsored by government, should be included. Based on how NPOs were defined among countries, an overall review of that part under our legal system somewhat is imminent and necessary. he core of this thesis is to research the entrusted agency relationship exists among people, bureaucratic system, legislators and GONGOs on the basis of “Principal-Agent Theory”. Moreover, further analyze on what costs governmental agencies’ insufficient supervision through the understanding of GONGOs’ current situation and the entrusted agency relationship between both GONGOs and authorities concerned. Ignored executive departments, people chose to mandate the Legislative Yuan, as executive departments’ proxy in terms of over sighting GONGOs, due to the latters’ poor performance. This research accordingly will be focus on the accountability of the Legislative Yuan’s oversight over all GONGOs. In addition, look into the whole situation of GONGOs’ 2009 budget reviewed by the Legislative Yuan. It will be stated by several parts; the reviewing process, the costs assumed during the reviewing period, and the final result achieved eventfully. he findings of this thesis found are as follows: First, it’s no doubt that the Legislative Yuan has absolute power to oversight GONGOs. Secondly, its role towards supervising GONGOs has change dramatically from either “prior & indirect”or “ex-post & direct” to both “both & ex-post” and “direct”. Third, there are still deficiencies have to be improved in terms of the current budgetary reviewing system; such as, the Budget law itself is not explicit enough, related standard does not meet oversight efficacy original proposed, it’s not proportionate to apply the same ceiling to supervise GONGOs which have different scales, and coordinating measures as how to prepare, review or enforce budgets, are inadequate. The last is it can be concluded that the budgetary reviewing process applied by the Legislative Yuan only reaches the early stage of disclosing GONGOs information.n conclusion, this thesis suggests that GONGOs structures need to be reformed by either merging or transforming process. Furthermore, the Budget Law should set up certain amount of budgets as a minimum standard in order to supervise GONGOs, also the part relating how to prepare budgets apparently should have an overall consideration. As far as the disclosure of information, comprehensive measures should be taken to reinforce. Finally, a special law of GONGOs and the timetable of transitional oversighting measures applied by the Legislative Yuan should be introduced as soon as possible.
Subjects
Legislative Yuan
Oversight
Government-operated Non-governmental organizations
Principal-Agent Theory
The Budget Law
Information disclosure
Type
thesis
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