依前科記錄執法之最適環境政策
Date Issued
2002
Date
2002
Author(s)
DOI
902415H002016
Abstract
In this essay we analyze the interplay between regulatory goals of the EPA and selfreporting
decisions of regulated polluting firms. We first consider the case of a bureaucratic
EPA that aims at maximizing fine revenues,sub ject to costly enforcement and
linear fine structure. It is shown that,in equilibrium, no inspection is worthwhile if a
firm’s reported emission exceeds a certain threshold level. As a result,a ll firms with actual
emissions higher than this level will falsely report exactly this amount. As for firms
reporting emission levels below this cut-off level,the EPA will randomly inspect them
with a probability just high enough to discourage dishonesty. Alternatively,if the EPA is
concerned with reporting compliance,a uniform audit policy should be adopted to induce
full honesty.
Interestingly,b oth EPA objectives will generate identical net expected revenues. But
in equilibrium,firms will incur more tax payment in the case of a compliance-oriented
regulator. Total inspection costs will be higher as well. In this regard,our model suggests
that revenue maximization is socially preferred to compliance maximization in terms of
social costs saved. (JEL classification: H26, Q28, D82)
Subjects
Enforcement
co mpliance
self -reporting
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學經濟學系暨研究所
Type
report
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