Managerial Motivation When Effort Improves Higher Order Risk
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Huang, Yen-Lin
Abstract
Managerial motivation has long been an important issue in economy. There are many papers discussing the “optimal contract design” that would optimize the effort spent by managers. However, the “optimal” contract may be affected by several factors and therefore can change over time. The problem “how the managerial motivation would be affected under certain type of contracts” has long been ignored. This article aim to figure out how managerial effort would be affected by the change of the parameters of the contract provided the effort improves higher order risk of production.
Subjects
高階風險
最適契約
經理人誘因
風險
風險趨避
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-103-R01723036-1.pdf
Size
23.32 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):67f46f42026ef2ee91156dff1064f097