Taipei Crisis Management on "Special State-to-state Relationship" and "One Country on Each Side"：A Comparative Study
Date Issued
2007
Date
2007
Author(s)
Shao, Jeng-Shing
DOI
zh-TW
Abstract
Taipei announced on two occasions the “Special State-to-State Relationship” and the “One Country on Each Side” on July 9, 1999 and August 3, 2002 respectively, which triggered the crises in the Taiwan-US（or Taiwan-China） relations. How did Taipei handle these situations? What are the similarities and differences between these two crisis managements? Is it possible to discuss more thoroughly the environment facing ROC (Taiwan), which tries to strive for its independent and sovereign status? After these two experiences, can we find a more appropriate approach to ensuring the security and benefits for all Taiwanese people and the sustainable peace of Taiwan?
There are seven chapters in this thesis and each chapter and section is logically arranged. In Chapter 1, I will discuss the motive and objective of this thesis, search and review of bibliographic materials, research method and approach, arrangement of chapters and sections, and the restrictions of this research. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the announcement of the “Special State-to-State Relationship” and its background. Under what kind of sovereign environment of Taiwan did former President Lee Teng-hui cogitate to “solidify Taiwanese sovereignty”? Through organizational formulating and research, former President Lee personally thought about how, when the time was right, he would interpret the “Special State-to-State Relationship”, which was proposed by some constitutional scholars, with more political implications (the so-called “Two-States Theory”). In Chapter 3, we will look at how Taipei reacted to the responses from the US and China? I analyzed Taipei’s crisis management under the verbal intimidation and saber rattling demonstrated by Beijing and the pressure from the US. Particularly, Taipei adjusted its declaration along the way, only to revert to the starting point in the end. We will examine the mutual effects between Taipei, the US and China in the process. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the announcement of the “One Country on Each Side” theory and its background: President Chen Shui-bian’s speeches before his inauguration, his goodwill toward China after he was sworn in, and the attitude of Beijing. we will examine how did President Chen announced the “One Country on Each Side” theory after feeling frustrated not getting direct and positive response from Beijing, and what this step signifies. In Chapter 5, I will discuss how Taipei dealt with the reactions from the US and China. We will observe how Taipei launched into explaining itself and actively went to the US to defend its declaration, while facing pressure from the US and suffering from Beijing’s verbal intimidation strategy. According to this, I have digested the differences of the crisis management between these two crises and made a comparison in the following chapters. In Chapter 6, before the conclusion, I will compare the differences and similarities of, as well as the reasons for these two crisis managements. And from the differences and similarities, a comparison is made to analyze the trend of Taiwan’s changing environment.
In Chapter 7, it comes to the conclusion of this thesis, which will include four aspects:
First, the “Special State-to-State Relationship” aspect: through the above-mentioned observation, it seems that the original meaning of the “Special State-to-State Relationship” came from some constitutional scholars, which was later interpreted with more political meanings (that is, the so-called “Two-States Theory”). There are three factors resulting in this crisis. One is that former President Lee announced the “Special State-to-State Relationship”. Another is Mr. Koo Chen-fu’s remarks on this issue on July 10. The other one is that on July 12, 1999 the press reported that the Taiwanese government was going to revise the constitution and some laws, and in that day afternoon Su Chi, chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, asserted in a press conference that the government would break the “one China” myth, a step later interpreted as Taiwan’s abandonment of “one China”.
Second, the “One Country on Each Side” aspect: the most possible scenario is for President Chen to announce the “One Country on Each Side” theory, which would not be a surprise. However, Beijing’s move to play down Taipei’s goodwill is widening the gap in the Cross-Strait relations.
Third, the comparison between these two crises: we can see that, although Taipei in some extent adjusted and improved their actions and policy, there were obviously still many similar domestic and foreign restrictions and constraints, and tendency toward inappropriate self-centered decision-making.
Fourth, the sovereign environment of Taiwan: Taiwan is a de facto independent and sovereign country, while also practically under grave oppression; the two factors combined to shape the sovereign environment of Taiwan. To make a breakthrough will mean to rely on solidifying the sovereign identity of the Taiwanese people and, maybe even more crucially, obtaining strong support from the US.
Finally, we will look at how, due to the constraints of limited information and materials, there still remain some controversial points, among which are three points I believe are important.
Subjects
危機處理
crisis management
“Special State-to-State Relationship”
“Two-States Theory”
“One Country on Each Side”
SDGs
Type
thesis