Sequential Versus Simultaneous Contribution Equilibria Under Alternative Public-Good Specifications
Journal
經濟論文叢刊
Journal Volume
26
Journal Issue
4
Pages
367-386
Date Issued
1998-12
Date
1998-12
Author(s)
Abstract
Private contribution to continuous public goods has been an area of extensive study in public economics. Most researchers, however, analyzed simultaneous-move contribution games. A notable exception is Varian (1994), who considers a Stackelberg game for the classical additive type of public goods. The main finding of Varian is that total contribution in a simultaneous-move Nash game is at least as large as that under a sequential setting. In this paper, we characterize both Nash and Stackelberg equilibria under the alternative public-good composition rules of weakestlink and best-shot. We claim that Varian's conclusion does not hold in these cases. For weakest-link public goods, Stackelberg outcome is found to be no less than its Nash counterpart, so Varian's conclusion is reversed. In the best-shot case, either setting may yield higher total public good supply than the other, due to a multiplicity of Nash equilibria and variations in Stackelbherg contribution sequences.
Subjects
公共財
循序捐獻
同時捐獻
最弱環
最強棒
Public good
Stackelberg game
Weakest-link
Best-shot
Type
journal article
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