Explore the Spatial Cultural Heritage With Principal-agent Theory Model: Taking Kinmen(Quemoy) as Example
Date Issued
2015
Date
2015
Author(s)
Wu, Tichia
Abstract
Due to the unique geographical environment and historical background, there are not only abundant landscape of cultural heritage villages but also widespread Cold-War outpost monuments on the Kinmen(Quemoy) island this day. Therefore, this place has been designated as one of the potential world heritage sites of Taiwan by our Ministry of Culture with the theme “Kinmen Battlefield Culture” applied. Because of the economical research on such kinds of wartime heritages was almost absent in Taiwan, this thesis will focus on the investigation of the compound features, property right patterns, and resource efficiency among the spatial cultural heritages.To be a compound composited with many elements, there are originality, systematic, inseparability, irreversible and irreplaceable features in the spatial cultural heritages. Because of its externality, the spatial cultural heritages are typical public goods which is just like the environmental goods. After the introduction to the characteristics of the public goods, publicity, and public domains in the chapter 2 of this thesis, the investigation on the content, structure and particularity in the property rights of the spatial cultural heritages became the first part of the chapter 3. With the following description about the variation of the characteristics of property rights and the transition of the public goods, we learn that the public goods or common pool resources (CPRs) with unclear property rights will not necessary cause the tragedy of the commons. In addition, the common resource problem of the public goods might be resolved through the well design and operation of the informal institutions.In order to clarify the relations among the property rights of spatial cultural assets, the author survey the issues about the rent-seeking and government decision problems with the application of the Buchanan T-C model in the chapter 4. After a dynamic game theory discussion between the relevant public, central government, local government, and asset business manager, this research learnt that the agent need to design effective incentives. For examples, the central government should increase the amount of the special transfer payment to the spatial cultural heritages. The arising punishment and management efficiency policy implemented by the local government will play an important role to control the management ability of the asset business manager. The trust and cooperation of the players in this game will display the overall degree of short-term interests renunciation and long-term interests maximization.To take the spatial cultural heritages of Kinmen as examples, there are further and actual case studies in the chapter 5. The topics of these discussion will including why the different types of the spatial cultural heritages are considered to have various public characters, and how the social heterogeneity affect the formation of the public domain and interfere with the preservation and maintenance of public resources. To considering the property right complex of the spatial cultural heritages, especially the wartime monuments which construct the cultural assets of Kinmen’s heritages landscape. There are many property right problems which are need to be clarified yet. In order to deal with these issues which related to the common pool resources and heterogeneous resources, this research quote the Polycentric Governance Theory by Ostrom, the Nobel Laureate in Economics, to avoid the tragedy of the anti-commons in such kinds of excessive finely differentiated property right situation. As for the future research, the author suggests the priority topics might be the formation analysis of the public sphere, the survey of transitions in property rights, the design on the management organization of the spatial cultural heritages, and an interaction strategy game model with better explanatory.
Subjects
Spatial Cultural Heritage
Public Good
Property Right
Game Theory
Principal-agent Theory
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-104-D90544004-1.pdf
Size
23.54 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):891a70841aa8aea1389a97c24d7e1a7e