Mechanism Design for Resource Allocation in Healthcare Organizations
Date Issued
2012
Date
2012
Author(s)
Lien, Kun-Liang
Abstract
Recently the healthcare industry draws much attention, and the examination resources are limited. Hence, resource allocation and use in healthcare organizations are interesting and important issues. Typically one dedicated unit is established for examination among different departments to integrate examination resources. The purpose of our study is to design the optimal resource allocation mechanism in the perspective of a healthcare organization. This paper investigates the incentive mechanism design problem for resource allocation in a healthcare organization so that the individual behavior of departments can coincide with the goal of the healthcare organization.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is widely applied to auction practices and the true willingness to pay of the bidders can be revealed under the VCG mechanism. We apply the VCG mechanism on the resource allocation problem in a healthcare organization so that departments are willing to report the true need of the examination resources. Then, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine how each type of the examination resources influences the transfer and the total payoff of a healthcare organization.
Subjects
resources allocation
mechanism design
Type
thesis
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