Limited attention, share repurchases, and takeover risk
Journal
Journal of Banking and Finance
Journal Volume
42
Journal Issue
1
Pages
283-301
Date Issued
2014
Author(s)
Abstract
We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms' lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital. ? 2014 Elsevier B.V.
Subjects
Limited attention; Long-run performance; Share buybacks; Takeover risk
SDGs
Type
journal article