A Three-Level Game: the Trade Negotiation between the R.O.C and the U.S., 1981-1988
Resource
政治科學論叢, 1, 219-239
Journal
政治科學論叢
Journal Issue
1
Pages
219-239
Date Issued
1990-03
Date
1990-03
Author(s)
Li, C.P.
Abstract
This paper examines the U.S.-R.O.C. trade negotiations between 1981 and 1988 in a tripolar model which analyzes the bilateral negotiations from three different dimension: the internal, the external, and the systemic negotiations. The model suggests that, theoretically, different variables might play different roles at different negotiation levels. For example, the characteristics of issues and the stage－society relationship may affect the agenda and the positions in the process of internal negotiation, while bargaining skill and power structure may influence the modes and atmosphere in external negotiations. Finally, the existence of non－existence of trade regimes may play a role in promoting or postponding agreements at the systemic level. Analyses indicate that in U.S.-R.O.C. trade negotiations, the bargaining strategies and behaviors do vary in accordance with the variables specified above, so that different strategies and behavioral patterns are shown under various circumstances.
Type
journal article