The Application of the Power Asymmetry Model and the Vote Maximizing Model to the Study of Cross-Strait Relations
Date Issued
1998-07-31
Date
1998-07-31
Author(s)
DOI
872414H002001
Abstract
This study analyzes the making of
Taiwan’s mainland policy. It combines the
“power asymmetry model” on the
international structural level and the “vote
maximizing model” on the domestic level for
a full analysis. The power asymmetry model
argues that Taiwan opts for “balancing” or
“bandwagoning” towards mainland China
based on the economic gap between the two
sides and the degree of Western (primarily
the US) support. It however lacks a
discussion of the domestic mechanism to
translate structural causes into concrete
policies. The vote maximizing model follows
the rational choice approach in asserting that
electoral competition tends to guide the
various political parties in Taiwan to adopt a
mainland policy that best suits the
preferences of the middle voters who
constitute the majority of Taiwan’s electorate.
The combination of the two models provides
an analysis that pinpoints both the structural
elements and domestic mechanism in the
making of Taiwan’s mainland policy.
Subjects
power asymmetry
vote maximization
balancing
bandwagoning
cross-Strait relations
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學政治學系暨研究所
Type
report
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