Decision-Making of Landowners' Participation in Agricultural Carbon Contract
Resource
農業與經濟, 46, 1-47
Journal
農業與經濟
Journal Issue
46
Pages
1-47
Date Issued
2011-06
Date
2011-06
Author(s)
Liu, W.Y.
Lin, K.C.
Abstract
Many countries in the world have actively adopted various kinds of
approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as agroforestry
projects, cropland management, soil carbon management, fallow
management, etc. In order to reduce the negative impacts due to the climate
change resulting from increasing greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol
allows developed countries to claim credits for carbon sequestered as a
result of LULUCF (land use, land-use change and forestry) activities. Most
literatures didn’t address the discussion of these parts in Taiwan. However
to enhance carbon sinks can be seen as one of the agricultural land use
patterns because the total area of fallow lands exceed that of paddy fields in
Taiwan. This study analyzes the optimal length of soil carbon contracts
which non-industrial private farmers participate in, and conducts the
comparative static analysis on discount rate, carbon price, and the upper
bound of cultivation intensity in soil carbon contracts. According to the
theoretical model derived from this study, if a farmer can determine the
length of his carbon contract, then the decrease of cultivation intensity will
reduce his present income, and the increase of the level of soil carbon
sequestration will increase his future income. As the total amount of soil
carbon sequestration increases, the marginal amount of soil carbon
sequestration will decrease, so the rational farmer will not choose the
unlimited carbon contract length. In addition, the factors affecting the
length of the carbon contract which is determined by farmers include
discount rate, carbon price and cultivation intensity. As the values of these
factors increase, the length of the carbon contract determined by farmers
will also increase. On the other side, as the cultivation intensity and carbon
price increases, farmers' income will increase; however as the discount rate
gets lower, the farmers' income will decrease. The result of this study is
consistent with that of Culati and Vercammen (2005); it is that if the
government raises the upper bound of cultivation intensity on soil carbon
contract, then it will increase farmers' participation incentives in the soil
carbon contract and the length of the carbon contract will increase.
Subjects
碳匯
耕地管理
農地碳匯合約
Carbon sequestration
Cropland management
Agricutlural land carbon contract
Type
journal article
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