External Knowledge, Tolerable Coordination Costs and Co-authorship
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Lee, Mateus
Abstract
This dissertation constructs a two-player sequential game to investigate the impacts of external knowledge stock, knowledge externality and tolerable coordination cost on individual’s decision-making in forming a link and the propensity for two authors in forming a co-authorship. In our model, we relax the assumption that the knowledge may exert positive and negative externality on an author’s knowledge production.
In chapter 2, we deduce an individual’s likelihood to participate in collaboration is affected by his tolerable coordination cost. We show that this tolerable coordination cost is influenced by the benefit gains due to collaboration, an author’s own and his partner’s costs of effort. Specifically, this dissertation is the first to conclude that the knowledge externalities (positive and negative) and the external knowledge stock affect an author’s decision-making to engage in collaboration or not.
In chapter 3, we examine the effects of expanding external knowledge stock on individual’s incentive to coauthor with others in the case of two authors have symmetric externalities. Our findings conclude that an academic with net positive (large negative) knowledge externality is more (less) likely to engage in co-authorship as external knowledge stock accumulates. Interestingly, the growing external knowledge promotes an academic with small negative knowledge externality to participate in scientific collaboration. Our model also predicts the impact of expanding external knowledge stock on two authors forming scientific collaboration. In an increased external knowledge stock, we predict that the propensity for two academics with positive knowledge externality forming co-authorship is always rising. This finding is surprisingly evident when two academics have small negative knowledge externality. In addition, we predict that the propensity for two academics with large negative knowledge externality forming co-authorship declines initially but rises gradually as external knowledge stock accumulates.
In chapter 4, we re-examine the effects of growing external knowledge stock on individual’s willingness to coauthor with each other for two authors have asymmetric externalities. We can conclude that an author’s willingness to engage in collaboration is always increasing in growing external knowledge stock for he and his partner have positive or small negative externalities at the same time. But an author’s willingness to join co-authorship declines initially but rises ultimately as the external knowledge grows whilst two authors have opposite externalities: one has a positive or small negative externality and another has a large negative externality, or two authors have large externalities at the same time. We also characterize the impacts of growing external knowledge stock on propensity for two authors forming co-authorship if they both have asymmetrical externalities. In the age of knowledge explosion, co-authorship seems more likely to occur when two authors have positive or small negative externalities. Whilst the incidence of co-authorship declines initially but raises gradually in the case of two authors have opposite externalities: one has a positive or small negative externality and another has a large negative externality, or two authors have large externalities at the same time.
Subjects
共同撰寫
外部知識存量
外部性
可容忍合作成本
共同撰寫的形成機率
Type
thesis
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